The Buffalo News, Cleveland Plain Dealer, and others got out of radio because newspapers were forced to divest radio and TV stations. GE was under some anti-trust pressure after acquiring RCA in 1985 and was looking to cash out some of what it considered "non-core assets."
The Cleveland Plain Dealer did not get out of radio due to divestment rules... which happened much more than a decade later. The chairman of the Plain Dealer (Forest City Publishing) board, Herman Lansing Vail, had decided around 1956 that radio was not going to be viable in the future and that they should sell "while they could". That was when John Kluge bought it and made it "Color Channel 14" and took it to a very strong #1 against the market's first fulltime Top 40, WERE.
It's in all of GE CEO Welch's writings that he did not believe in being in any field where he could not be #1 or #2. His mantra was "change before you have to." Radio was not a field where station ownership had the possibility of achieving dominance due to the 7/7/7 rules, so he got out of radio.
It wasn't so much the audience that drove that. It was consultants in the '70s and '80s who insisted that "It's my format, not those pesky disk jockeys" who make a station successful.
When I first got to program a million+ population CHR in 1964, I followed the lead of what I read in the trades as well as my experience with group owner Radio Centro in Mexico. I read Billboard, subscribed to the Gavin report, and had visited lots of "big" Top 40 stations. And I was counseled just before his death by Todd Storz who showed me deeply how to create categories of rotations and require all air talents to follow the lists and rotations.
So in the earlier 60's, I saw multiple successful Top 40 stations playing strictly rotated playlists. Before carts, we usually had a box (or bin in a box) for the 45's of each category and we played the one at the front and put it in the back after airplay. We could only change the order by moving a song back by one position if the same artist was just played in a different category.
After all, disk jockeys might move on to bigger markets, or, worse, go across the street to a competitor who offered a better deal. Even non-competes couldn't eliminate that possibility. GMs were promised that de-emphasizing local personalities and adding "major market talent" via syndication would mean better and more stable profits. Real results varied. Howard Stern and others did well in some markets, not so well in others, depending the quality of the competition and the signal.
In the early 60's we understood "stationality" and wanted to make sure that the music and the rotations were "as planned" in all hours and with all the jocks. If you know of actual exceptions, that is what they were: "exception".
To the rest of us, "Top 40" meant around 40 songs divided into categories that had different rotations. The top song, such as at WABC, might have played every 90 minutes to two hours. Then another group played perhaps 30 minutes more distanced. If you do the math, on 40 songs at about 14 an hour (short songs in the 60's but lots more commercials and newscasts), it gave only about 3 hours average rotation. Some played multiple times, others just barely played in 3 hours.
And "Top 40" was exactly that. About 40 songs, maybe 5 "hitbounds" and the like, and sometimes a "flashback" as we got into playing gold even in the early 60's.
Add the dilution of markets by Docket 80-90 stations and the removal of the 7-7-7 rule and you get the buying spree by big broadcasters who sought to establish de-factor monopolies in some markets. If you were a station owner and somebody offered you 15, 20, or 25 times your annual profit to sell your station, how could you resist? You could invest the cash and take the dividends and make at least the same money without the headache of running radio stations and/or competing with the big boys and their deep pockets. It was a no-brainer for a lot of people. It led to bankruptcy for virtually all of the consolidators.
No, it did not. You are focusing on the very big ones, but not the smaller regional groups like Sorenson in SD, NE and MN or Lotus in CA, NV and AZ or UnoRadio in Puerto Rico and many more local or regional groups. And look at "bigger" groups like Saga, Summit, Townsquare and the like who have been very successful by more focused consolidation.
"Synergies" and cutting their way to prosperity ended up reducing revenues, not increasing them, and the money lenders wanted their money.
Initially, the idea of consolidation was not to save on operations. In fact, the main focus was being able to present a 3, 4, 5 station "menu" to local advertisers and take large parts of local budgets. Only after the 2008 recession did we see cost cutting come into effect because the economic downturn caused many businesses big-and-small to cut advertising.
In fact, the first dozen years or so of consolidation worked very well... just as it had done in much of the rest of the world.
In the 60's I built a cluster of 5 FMs and 4 AMs in Quito, Ecuador, a market of about 1,000,000. By making it easier to buy for ad agencies... and by offering better and easier paperwork and by giving huge combined ratings efficiency, advertisers preferred my group to the other 35 station in the market. And that was sixty-some years ago.
Where did I learn that building a cluster was the best way to operate? I interned in Mexico city at a group of 5 stations. We competed with several groups that had 3 and 4 stations each, and several more that had two stations. The bigger the package you could offer to agencies, the more you sold.
So, stockholders took it in the shorts and vulture capitalists ended up owning radio stations.
Most of the "big" issues had to do with one of two factors: the 2008 recession or a couple of less-than-competent group CEO's who "dicked" around and ruined good stations. There was, however, nothing wrong with consolidation; there was a lot wrong with the economy.
Then came the internet, streaming, etc., and you know the rest. Skeleton staffs are trying to hang on until retirement while managers try suck whatever marrow is left in the bones to get their bonuses before they pull the rip cord on their golden parachutes.
This is where I have to avoid the comparison with blacksmiths and horseshoes.